{
    "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
    "dataVersion": "5.2",
    "cveMetadata": {
        "cveId": "CVE-2026-90832",
        "assignerOrgId": "e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad",
        "state": "PUBLISHED",
        "assignerShortName": "zephyr",
        "dateReserved": "2026-09-13T19:22:56.728Z",
        "datePublished": "2026-11-10T22:07:37.866Z",
        "dateUpdated": "2026-11-10T22:07:37.866Z"
    },
    "containers": {
        "cna": {
            "providerMetadata": {
                "orgId": "e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad",
                "shortName": "zephyr",
                "dateUpdated": "2026-11-10T22:07:37.866Z"
            },
            "title": "Out-of-bounds read in Bluetooth Host periodic advertising report reassembly due to unvalidated report length",
            "descriptions": [
                {
                    "lang": "en",
                    "value": "bt_hci_le_per_adv_report_common() in subsys/bluetooth/host/scan.c handles the HCI_LE_Periodic_Advertising_Report (and _v2) event. It verified that the fixed event header was present and that the controller-declared Data_Length fits the tailroom of the periodic-sync reassembly buffer, but never checked that the event actually carried as many data bytes as evt->length claims. Both reassembly paths — DATA_STATUS_PARTIAL, and DATA_STATUS_COMPLETE while a chain is already in progress — then called net_buf_simple_add_mem(&per_adv_sync->reassembly, buf->data, evt->length), copying up to 255 bytes starting past the end of the event's real payload.\n\nThe Data_Length field originates in the HCI controller, so the flaw is reachable in host-only/split builds where the controller is a separate part reached over H4 UART, SPI, USB or an inter-core IPC transport: a malicious, compromised or buggy controller (or an attacker able to inject on that link) can send a report declaring a length larger than the event payload. The generic event dispatcher in subsys/bluetooth/host/hci_core.c only enforces a per-event minimum length and never cross-checks the subevent's internal length field, so nothing else catches it. Builds using Zephyr's own in-image controller are not affected, because the controller always emits a length matching the bytes it appends.\n\nExploitation additionally requires CONFIG_BT_PER_ADV_SYNC with CONFIG_BT_PER_ADV_SYNC_BUF_SIZE > 0 (the option defaults to 0, which compiles the reassembly block out; LE Audio broadcast-sink and Public Broadcast Profile applications that reassemble fragmented periodic advertising data set it), and an established periodic advertising sync.\n\nThe consequence is an out-of-bounds read of adjacent HCI RX-pool memory — including stale contents of previously received HCI events — which is copied into the reassembly buffer and then delivered to every registered bt_le_per_adv_sync_cb.recv listener as if it were received advertising data, so the disclosed memory becomes application-visible and may be forwarded off-device. The write side remains in bounds because the tailroom check uses the same length value, so there is no memory corruption; impact is limited to information disclosure and undefined behaviour on the over-read. The fix drops any report whose declared length exceeds the remaining event payload, matching the guard already present in the extended and legacy advertising report handlers."
                }
            ],
            "affected": [
                {
                    "vendor": "zephyrproject",
                    "product": "zephyr",
                    "collectionURL": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr",
                    "packageName": "zephyr",
                    "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
                    "programFiles": [
                        "subsys/bluetooth/host/scan.c"
                    ],
                    "programRoutines": [
                        {
                            "name": "bt_hci_le_per_adv_report"
                        },
                        {
                            "name": "bt_hci_le_per_adv_report_common"
                        }
                    ],
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": "3.0.0",
                            "status": "affected",
                            "versionType": "semver",
                            "lessThan": "4.3.2"
                        },
                        {
                            "version": "4.4.0",
                            "status": "affected",
                            "versionType": "semver",
                            "lessThan": "4.5.0"
                        }
                    ]
                }
            ],
            "references": [
                {
                    "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/e9c3252c244b094b9caf6f426ffb77c509e58a9f",
                    "name": "Fix commit",
                    "tags": [
                        "patch"
                    ]
                },
                {
                    "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-2q4q-gv2c-997j",
                    "name": "GHSA-2q4q-gv2c-997j"
                }
            ],
            "metrics": [
                {
                    "format": "CVSS",
                    "cvssV3_1": {
                        "version": "3.1",
                        "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
                        "baseScore": 4.3,
                        "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM"
                    }
                }
            ],
            "problemTypes": [
                {
                    "descriptions": [
                        {
                            "lang": "en",
                            "description": "bounds",
                            "cweId": "CWE-125",
                            "type": "CWE"
                        }
                    ]
                }
            ],
            "x_generator": {
                "engine": "cvelib 1.8.0"
            }
        }
    }
}