### Summary
`qs.stringify` throws a `TypeError` when it serializes an object whose own `constructor` property has a truthy, non-callable `isBuffer` member. `utils.isBuffer` duck-types buffers by calling `obj.constructor.isBuffer(obj)` after checking only that the property is truthy, so a value such as `{ constructor: { isBuffer: \"x\" } }` makes the call throw `TypeError: obj.constructor.isBuffer is not a function`.
### Details
`lib/stringify.js:127` calls `utils.isBuffer` on every non-primitive value it serializes. `utils.isBuffer` (`lib/utils.js:332`) reads `obj.constructor.isBuffer` and invokes it without verifying that it is a function. `constructor` and `isBuffer` are ordinary property names, so any object carrying them as own properties reaches the unchecked call.
Such an object can be built from untrusted input. `qs.parse(\"x[constructor][isBuffer]=y\", { plainObjects: true })` or `{ allowPrototypes: true }` keeps the `constructor` key as an own property (the default parse options drop it), and `JSON.parse(\"{\\\"a\\\":{\\\"constructor\\\":{\\\"isBuffer\\\":\\\"x\\\"}}}\")` produces the same shape with no qs option involved. Express 4 with its default `query parser` setting and body-parser with `extended: true` both call `qs.parse` with `allowPrototypes: true`, so on those stacks `req.query` and `req.body` can carry the shape directly.
#### PoC
```js
var qs = require(\"qs\");
qs.stringify(qs.parse(\"x[constructor][isBuffer]=y\", { plainObjects: true }));
qs.stringify(JSON.parse(\"{\\\"a\\\":{\\\"constructor\\\":{\\\"isBuffer\\\":\\\"x\\\"}}}\"));
// TypeError: obj.constructor.isBuffer is not a function
// at Object.isBuffer (lib/utils.js:332:78)
// at stringify (lib/stringify.js:127:45)
```
#### Fix
`lib/utils.js`, applied in e83d321 on `main` and released as v6.16.0:
```diff
- return !!(obj.constructor && obj.constructor.isBuffer && obj.constructor.isBuffer(obj));
+ return !!(obj.constructor && typeof obj.constructor.isBuffer === \"function\" && obj.constructor.isBuffer(obj));
```
Real `Buffer`, `safer-buffer`, and browserify `buffer` polyfill instances serialize exactly as before; only the throw is removed.
### Affected versions
`>=2.2.5 <6.16.0`, fixed in v6.16.0.
The unguarded duck-type was introduced in 3768a75 and first shipped in v2.2.5 (September 2014). v2.2.4 and earlier used `Buffer.isBuffer` and are not affected. Every release from v2.2.5 through v6.15.3 contains the unguarded call.
### Impact
An unauthenticated request can make any code path that re-serializes attacker-influenced data with `qs.stringify` (for example, rebuilding a query string from `req.query` for a redirect or an upstream request, or serializing a parsed JSON body) throw synchronously. In a typical Node.js HTTP framework the throw is caught by the framework error boundary and the affected request returns a 500; the process survives and other requests are unaffected. Where the call runs outside an error boundary, such as an `async` Express 4 handler (where the throw becomes an unhandled promise rejection) or a background job, the process exits, so the impact in that case depends on the application error handling rather than on qs.
" } ] } ], "references": [ { "url": "https://github.com/ljharb/qs/security/advisories/GHSA-4mjr-xmp4-gh2g", "tags": [ "vendor-advisory" ] }, { "url": "https://github.com/ljharb/qs/commit/e83d321ffafb38cf210683ac31714fce6ce1c6c6", "tags": [ "patch" ] } ], "metrics": [ { "format": "CVSS", "scenarios": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "GENERAL" } ], "cvssV3_1": { "version": "3.1", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "userInteraction": "NONE", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "confidentialityImpact": "NONE", "integrityImpact": "NONE", "availabilityImpact": "LOW", "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "baseScore": 5.3, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L" } }, { "format": "CVSS", "scenarios": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "GENERAL" } ], "cvssV4_0": { "attackVector": "NETWORK", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackRequirements": "PRESENT", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "LOW", "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED", "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED", "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED", "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED", "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED", "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED", "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED", "version": "4.0", "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "baseScore": 6.3, "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N" } } ], "workarounds": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "Pass a `filter` function to `qs.stringify` that drops values carrying an own `constructor` property; it runs before the `isBuffer` check. Alternatively, wrap `qs.stringify` calls on externally influenced objects in try/catch, and avoid `allowPrototypes: true` / `plainObjects: true` when parsed untrusted input is fed back into `qs.stringify`.", "supportingMedia": [ { "type": "text/html", "base64": false, "value": "Pass a `filter` function to `qs.stringify` that drops values carrying an own `constructor` property; it runs before the `isBuffer` check. Alternatively, wrap `qs.stringify` calls on externally influenced objects in try/catch, and avoid `allowPrototypes: true` / `plainObjects: true` when parsed untrusted input is fed back into `qs.stringify`.
" } ] } ], "solutions": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "Upgrade to qs 6.16.0 or later.", "supportingMedia": [ { "type": "text/html", "base64": false, "value": "Upgrade to qs 6.16.0 or later.
" } ] } ], "credits": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "waydeshi", "type": "finder" }, { "lang": "en", "value": "ljharb", "type": "remediation developer" } ], "source": { "discovery": "EXTERNAL" } }, "adp": [ { "references": [ { "url": "https://github.com/ljharb/qs/security/advisories/GHSA-4mjr-xmp4-gh2g", "tags": [ "exploit" ] } ], "metrics": [ { "other": { "type": "ssvc", "content": { "timestamp": "2026-08-31T17:07:54.823942Z", "id": "CVE-2026-82417", "options": [ { "Exploitation": "poc" }, { "Automatable": "yes" }, { "Technical Impact": "partial" } ], "role": "CISA Coordinator", "version": "2.0.3" } } } ], "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment", "providerMetadata": { "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "shortName": "CISA-ADP", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-31T17:08:24.074Z" } } ] } }