{
    "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
    "dataVersion": "5.2",
    "cveMetadata": {
        "cveId": "CVE-2026-80212",
        "assignerOrgId": "8254265b-2729-46b6-b9e3-3dfca2d5bfca",
        "state": "PUBLISHED",
        "assignerShortName": "mitre",
        "dateReserved": "2026-08-26T01:42:16.295Z",
        "datePublished": "2026-08-27T14:15:04.403Z",
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-27T19:33:58.773Z"
    },
    "containers": {
        "cna": {
            "affected": [
                {
                    "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
                    "packageURL": "pkg:gem/resolv",
                    "product": "resolv",
                    "vendor": "Ruby",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "lessThan": "0.3.2",
                            "status": "affected",
                            "version": "0",
                            "versionType": "semver"
                        },
                        {
                            "lessThan": "0.7.2",
                            "status": "affected",
                            "version": "0.4.0",
                            "versionType": "semver"
                        }
                    ]
                }
            ],
            "descriptions": [
                {
                    "lang": "en",
                    "value": "An issue was discovered in the resolv gem before 0.7.2 for Ruby. Resolv::DNS::Resource.get_class, Resolv::DNS::Resource::Generic.create, and Resolv::DNS::SvcParam::Generic.create generate a new class for each unknown DNS resource record (type, class) pair, or each unknown SvcParamKey, encountered while decoding a response. Each generated class was permanently registered both as a constant on Resource (or SvcParam::Generic) and as an entry in a class-lookup hash (ClassHash), and thus the class remained reachable through that constant after the response was discarded. Type and class are each 16-bit values, and thus an attacker controlling DNS responses (a spoofed response, or a malicious or hijacked upstream DNS server) has roughly 2^32 distinct (type, class) pairs to choose from. A single response of a few hundred kilobytes carrying tens of thousands of distinct unknown types permanently grows process memory by tens of megabytes; repeated responses accumulate without bound and are never reclaimed by garbage collection, because the constant keeps each class alive. Any code path that calls Resolv::DNS::Message.decode on attacker-influenced DNS responses is affected. resolv is a default gem, and thus this is reachable from a plain Ruby installation without any additional dependency."
                }
            ],
            "metrics": [
                {
                    "cvssV3_1": {
                        "attackComplexity": "LOW",
                        "attackVector": "NETWORK",
                        "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
                        "baseScore": 7.5,
                        "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
                        "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
                        "integrityImpact": "NONE",
                        "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
                        "scope": "UNCHANGED",
                        "userInteraction": "NONE",
                        "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
                        "version": "3.1"
                    },
                    "format": "CVSS",
                    "scenarios": [
                        {
                            "lang": "en",
                            "value": "GENERAL"
                        }
                    ]
                }
            ],
            "problemTypes": [
                {
                    "descriptions": [
                        {
                            "cweId": "CWE-770",
                            "description": "CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling",
                            "lang": "en",
                            "type": "CWE"
                        }
                    ]
                }
            ],
            "providerMetadata": {
                "orgId": "8254265b-2729-46b6-b9e3-3dfca2d5bfca",
                "shortName": "mitre",
                "dateUpdated": "2026-08-27T14:15:04.403Z"
            },
            "references": [
                {
                    "url": "https://github.com/ruby/resolv"
                },
                {
                    "url": "https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2026/08/27/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-resolv/"
                }
            ],
            "x_generator": {
                "engine": "CVE-Request-form 0.0.1"
            }
        },
        "adp": [
            {
                "metrics": [
                    {
                        "other": {
                            "type": "ssvc",
                            "content": {
                                "timestamp": "2026-08-27T19:33:50.602678Z",
                                "id": "CVE-2026-80212",
                                "options": [
                                    {
                                        "Exploitation": "none"
                                    },
                                    {
                                        "Automatable": "yes"
                                    },
                                    {
                                        "Technical Impact": "partial"
                                    }
                                ],
                                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                                "version": "2.0.3"
                            }
                        }
                    }
                ],
                "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment",
                "providerMetadata": {
                    "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
                    "shortName": "CISA-ADP",
                    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-27T19:33:58.773Z"
                }
            }
        ]
    }
}