{
    "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
    "dataVersion": "5.2",
    "cveMetadata": {
        "cveId": "CVE-2026-12045",
        "assignerOrgId": "f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007",
        "state": "PUBLISHED",
        "assignerShortName": "PostgreSQL",
        "dateReserved": "2026-06-11T20:40:06.461Z",
        "datePublished": "2026-06-18T23:37:35.182Z",
        "dateUpdated": "2026-06-23T03:55:43.509Z"
    },
    "containers": {
        "cna": {
            "providerMetadata": {
                "orgId": "f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007",
                "shortName": "PostgreSQL",
                "dateUpdated": "2026-06-18T23:37:35.182Z"
            },
            "title": "pgAdmin 4: AI Assistant read-only transaction bypass allows unauthorised writes and remote code execution",
            "affected": [
                {
                    "vendor": "pgadmin.org",
                    "product": "pgAdmin 4",
                    "repo": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4",
                    "modules": [
                        "AI Assistant",
                        "LLM Tools"
                    ],
                    "programFiles": [
                        "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/llm/tools/database.py"
                    ],
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "status": "affected",
                            "version": "9.13",
                            "lessThan": "9.16",
                            "versionType": "custom"
                        }
                    ],
                    "defaultStatus": "unaffected"
                }
            ],
            "descriptions": [
                {
                    "lang": "en",
                    "value": "Read-only transaction bypass in the pgAdmin 4 AI Assistant allows an attacker who can influence database content that the assistant reads to execute arbitrary SQL with the privileges of the pgAdmin user's database role.\n\nThe AI Assistant's execute_sql_query tool runs LLM-generated SQL inside a BEGIN TRANSACTION READ ONLY wrapper to prevent data modification. The LLM-supplied query was forwarded to the database driver without restriction to a single statement or to read-only verbs, so a multi-statement payload beginning with COMMIT, END, ROLLBACK, or ABORT terminated the read-only transaction and ran subsequent statements in autocommit mode. The trailing ROLLBACK then had no effect.\n\nDelivery is via prompt injection: an attacker who can write content into any object the AI Assistant may inspect (a row, a column value, a comment) can cause the LLM to emit the multi-statement payload as a tool call. With ordinary write privileges on the pgAdmin user's role the attacker can perform unauthorised data modification. When the pgAdmin user's role is a PostgreSQL superuser or holds pg_execute_server_program, the chain extends to remote code execution on the database server host via COPY ... TO PROGRAM.\n\nFix validates the LLM-supplied query up front: it must parse to exactly one non-empty / non-comment statement whose leading real token (after stripping whitespace, comments, and punctuation) is one of SELECT, WITH, EXPLAIN, SHOW, VALUES, or TABLE. Transaction-control verbs, DML, DDL, CALL, COPY, DO, SET/RESET, and everything else are rejected before any database work happens. PostgreSQL's READ ONLY mode continues to backstop data-modifying CTEs, EXPLAIN ANALYZE on writes, and volatile side effects.\n\nThis issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 9.13 before 9.16."
                }
            ],
            "references": [
                {
                    "url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10022",
                    "tags": [
                        "issue-tracking"
                    ]
                },
                {
                    "url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/bf4792444446f0e7ab721d23cbd6bfe6afaa7a8b",
                    "tags": [
                        "patch"
                    ]
                }
            ],
            "metrics": [
                {
                    "format": "CVSS",
                    "scenarios": [
                        {
                            "lang": "en",
                            "value": "Threat model: indirect prompt injection. An attacker with low-privilege DB write access plants a payload in any object the AI Assistant might read (table row, column value, comment). When a pgAdmin user with a higher-privilege role (typically PostgreSQL superuser or holder of pg_execute_server_program) opens the AI Assistant against that content, the LLM emits the multi-statement payload as a tool call. The crafted payload uses COMMIT / END / ROLLBACK / ABORT to close the wrapping read-only transaction, then COPY ... TO PROGRAM to gain OS code execution on the DB host.\n\nS:C is earned by the confused-deputy pattern: the attacker is not the LLM user; third-party DB content steers the user's LLM session to execute writes the user did not authorise. This does *not* score the user self-jailbreaking their own assistant -- only the indirect-injection vector.\n\nAlternative: AC:H (-> 8.0 HIGH) is defensible given LLM non-determinism (the payload doesn't fire every invocation) and the superuser-victim precondition. The 9.0 figure is the optimistic end of the range."
                        }
                    ],
                    "cvssV3_1": {
                        "version": "3.1",
                        "attackVector": "NETWORK",
                        "attackComplexity": "LOW",
                        "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
                        "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
                        "scope": "CHANGED",
                        "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
                        "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
                        "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
                        "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
                        "baseScore": 9,
                        "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"
                    }
                },
                {
                    "format": "CVSS",
                    "scenarios": [
                        {
                            "lang": "en",
                            "value": "Same reasoning as the CVSS 3.1 entry: indirect prompt injection, third-party content drives the user's LLM session, COPY ... TO PROGRAM reaches the DB host. VC:H/VI:H/VA:H + SC:H/SI:H/SA:H since RCE on the DB host compromises both pgAdmin's authority and the downstream system. UI:P captures that the user merely uses the AI Assistant normally; the attacker does not direct any specific user action."
                        }
                    ],
                    "cvssV4_0": {
                        "version": "4.0",
                        "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
                        "baseScore": 9.4,
                        "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL"
                    }
                }
            ],
            "problemTypes": [
                {
                    "descriptions": [
                        {
                            "lang": "en",
                            "description": "CWE-89 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')",
                            "cweId": "CWE-89",
                            "type": "CWE"
                        },
                        {
                            "lang": "en",
                            "description": "CWE-77 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')",
                            "cweId": "CWE-77",
                            "type": "CWE"
                        }
                    ]
                }
            ],
            "credits": [
                {
                    "lang": "en",
                    "value": "Isaac Chen <isaac9503@gmail.com>",
                    "type": "finder"
                },
                {
                    "lang": "en",
                    "value": "Dave Page <page@pgadmin.org>",
                    "type": "remediation developer"
                },
                {
                    "lang": "en",
                    "value": "Kundan Sable <kundan.sable@enterprisedb.com>",
                    "type": "remediation reviewer"
                }
            ],
            "source": {
                "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
            }
        },
        "adp": [
            {
                "metrics": [
                    {
                        "other": {
                            "type": "ssvc",
                            "content": {
                                "timestamp": "2026-06-22T00:00:00+00:00",
                                "options": [
                                    {
                                        "Exploitation": "none"
                                    },
                                    {
                                        "Automatable": "no"
                                    },
                                    {
                                        "Technical Impact": "total"
                                    }
                                ],
                                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                                "version": "2.0.3",
                                "id": "CVE-2026-12045"
                            }
                        }
                    }
                ],
                "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment",
                "providerMetadata": {
                    "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
                    "shortName": "CISA-ADP",
                    "dateUpdated": "2026-06-23T03:55:43.509Z"
                }
            }
        ]
    }
}