{ "dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": { "cveId": "CVE-2026-12044", "assignerOrgId": "f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "PostgreSQL", "dateReserved": "2026-06-11T20:40:05.751Z", "datePublished": "2026-06-18T23:37:16.202Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-06-22T18:37:05.999Z" }, "containers": { "cna": { "providerMetadata": { "orgId": "f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007", "shortName": "PostgreSQL", "dateUpdated": "2026-06-18T23:37:16.202Z" }, "title": "pgAdmin 4: SQL injection in COMMENT ON ... IS '' rendering across dialog templates", "affected": [ { "vendor": "pgadmin.org", "product": "pgAdmin 4", "repo": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4", "modules": [ "Domains", "Domain Constraints", "Foreign Tables", "Languages", "Event Triggers", "Views", "Tables", "Indexes", "Index Constraints", "Exclusion Constraints", "Materialized Views", "Driver (qtLiteral)" ], "programFiles": [ "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/utils/driver/psycopg3/__init__.py", "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/browser/server_groups/servers/databases/schemas/domains/templates/domains/sql/default/create.sql", "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/browser/server_groups/servers/databases/schemas/tables/templates/tables/sql/16_plus/stats.sql" ], "versions": [ { "status": "affected", "version": "1.0", "lessThan": "9.16", "versionType": "custom" } ], "defaultStatus": "unaffected" } ], "descriptions": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "SQL injection in pgAdmin 4 across every dialog template that renders ``COMMENT ON ... IS ''`` for a user-supplied description field. The Jinja templates for Domains (and their constraints), Foreign Tables, Languages, and Event Triggers, plus the Views OID-lookup query, interpolated the description directly inside a single-quoted SQL literal -- ``'{{ data.description }}'`` -- instead of passing it through the ``qtLiteral`` escape filter. An authenticated pgAdmin user with permission to create or alter the affected object types could submit a description containing an apostrophe, break out of the literal and chain arbitrary SQL. The injected SQL runs under the PostgreSQL role the user is already authenticated as; for a connected role with ``COPY ... TO/FROM PROGRAM`` (typically PostgreSQL superuser), this chains to OS command execution on the PostgreSQL host. The defect does not cross a privilege boundary -- the user already has direct SQL access to that role through pgAdmin's Query Tool -- so the attacker gains no capability beyond what their database role already grants. The marginal impact captures bypass of any application-layer Query Tool gating an operator may have configured.\n\nThe defect was originally reported against the Domain Dialog ``description`` field; a code-wide audit identified sixteen sites of the same pattern across the templates listed above. The same review also surfaced ten related sinks in the pgstattuple/pgstatindex stats templates -- ``pgstattuple('{{schema}}.{{table}}')`` and the matching pgstatindex shape -- where ``qtIdent`` escapes embedded double quotes inside the identifier but not apostrophes, so a user with CREATE privilege on a schema could plant a table or index named ``foo'bar`` and a later stats viewer would render an unbalanced literal.\n\nFix is layered:\n\n 1. Sites: replace every ``'{{ x.description }}'`` with ``{{ x.description|qtLiteral(conn) }}`` (no surrounding quotes -- the filter wraps the value in escaped quotes itself). Plumb ``conn=self.conn`` through every ``render_template`` call that loads one of these templates. Also corrects a ``{ % elif`` Jinja typo in the foreign-table schema diff (dead branch). Rewrite the ten pgstattuple/pgstatindex stats sites to address the relation via OID + ``::oid::regclass`` cast (e.g. ``pgstattuple({{ tid }}::oid::regclass)``), eliminating the embedded literal-call form entirely so that bug-class can no longer recur there.\n\n 2. Driver hardening: ``qtLiteral`` (in ``utils/driver/psycopg3/__init__.py``) used to silently return the raw unescaped value when its ``conn`` argument was falsy. It now raises ``ValueError`` -- surfacing the entire bug class going forward. The change immediately uncovered eight latent plumbing bugs (in ``schemas/__init__.py``, ``schemas/functions/__init__.py``, ``schemas/tables/utils.py``, ``foreign_servers/__init__.py``, and seven sites in ``roles/__init__.py``) -- all fixed as part of this patch. The inner ``except`` block that swallowed adapter-level failures and returned the raw value is also removed, so unadaptable inputs raise instead of leaking unescaped values.\n\n 3. Regression tests: a per-template behavioural test renders each previously-vulnerable template with an apostrophe-injection payload and asserts the escaped fragment is present and the vulnerable fragment absent; a lint test walks every ``*.sql`` template flagging any ``'{{ ... }}'`` single-quote-wrapped interpolation against an explicit allowlist; unit tests cover the new qtLiteral fail-fast and inner-except raise paths.\n\nThis issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 1.0 before 9.16." } ], "references": [ { "url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10078", "tags": [ "issue-tracking" ] }, { "url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/658bb585d", "tags": [ "patch" ] }, { "url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/2ae0d3610", "tags": [ "patch" ] } ], "metrics": [ { "format": "CVSS", "scenarios": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "The 8.8 is earned by the stored pgstattuple / pgstatindex sinks (commit 2ae0d3610). The chain: a low-privilege user with CREATE on a schema names a table or index containing an apostrophe (e.g. foo'bar); pgAdmin's stats templates render that identifier inside a string literal -- pgstattuple('schema.foo'bar') -- when a *different* user views statistics on the object. If the viewing user is a PostgreSQL superuser, the SQL injection executes under the superuser role, reaching COPY ... TO/FROM PROGRAM and OS code execution on the DB host. The privilege crossing (low-priv planter -> superuser viewer) is what justifies C:H/I:H/A:H even with S:U: the impact is felt by a different security principal than the attacker, but it lands inside the same DB authority.\n\nThe originally-reported Domain Dialog description field is the same code-class but is self-SQLi -- the user injecting the apostrophe is the user whose role runs it. That sub-vector alone would score in the #10026 range (4.3 MEDIUM); it is bundled here because the fix is the same qtLiteral plumbing across all sixteen sites.\n\nS:U because pgAdmin does not mediate a privilege boundary between the planter, the viewer, and the DB role; the boundary that is crossed lives entirely inside PostgreSQL's privilege model." } ], "cvssV3_1": { "version": "3.1", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "userInteraction": "NONE", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H" } }, { "format": "CVSS", "scenarios": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "Same reasoning as the CVSS 3.1 entry: the stored pgstattuple sink is the load-bearing impact (low-priv planter, superuser viewer, superuser-role SQL). VC:H/VI:H/VA:H from the COPY ... TO PROGRAM reach; SC/SI/SA:N because pgAdmin is not the security authority being crossed -- the boundary lives in PostgreSQL." } ], "cvssV4_0": { "version": "4.0", "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N", "baseScore": 8.7, "baseSeverity": "HIGH" } } ], "problemTypes": [ { "descriptions": [ { "lang": "en", "description": "CWE-89 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "cweId": "CWE-89", "type": "CWE" }, { "lang": "en", "description": "CWE-116 Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output", "cweId": "CWE-116", "type": "CWE" } ] } ], "credits": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "Jasser Chebbi ", "type": "finder" }, { "lang": "en", "value": "Dave Page ", "type": "remediation developer" }, { "lang": "en", "value": "Ashesh Vashi ", "type": "remediation developer" } ], "source": { "discovery": "EXTERNAL" } }, "adp": [ { "metrics": [ { "other": { "type": "ssvc", "content": { "timestamp": "2026-06-22T18:36:59.059744Z", "id": "CVE-2026-12044", "options": [ { "Exploitation": "none" }, { "Automatable": "no" }, { "Technical Impact": "total" } ], "role": "CISA Coordinator", "version": "2.0.3" } } } ], "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment", "providerMetadata": { "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "shortName": "CISA-ADP", "dateUpdated": "2026-06-22T18:37:05.999Z" } } ] } }