{
    "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
    "dataVersion": "5.2",
    "cveMetadata": {
        "cveId": "CVE-2026-102715",
        "assignerOrgId": "e51fbebd-6053-4e49-959f-1b94eeb69a2c",
        "state": "PUBLISHED",
        "assignerShortName": "eclipse",
        "dateReserved": "2026-09-29T16:15:11.235Z",
        "datePublished": "2026-09-29T17:42:35.719Z",
        "dateUpdated": "2026-09-29T18:42:21.812Z"
    },
    "containers": {
        "cna": {
            "providerMetadata": {
                "orgId": "e51fbebd-6053-4e49-959f-1b94eeb69a2c",
                "shortName": "eclipse",
                "dateUpdated": "2026-09-29T17:42:35.719Z"
            },
            "title": "mDNS string-cache lookup matches on slot size, so a peer name aliases a shorter one and the response encoder writes past the packet",
            "problemTypes": [
                {
                    "descriptions": [
                        {
                            "lang": "en",
                            "cweId": "CWE-787",
                            "description": "CWE-787 Out-of-bounds Write",
                            "type": "CWE"
                        }
                    ]
                }
            ],
            "affected": [
                {
                    "vendor": "Eclipse Foundation",
                    "product": "eclipse-threadx/netxduo",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "status": "affected",
                            "version": "0",
                            "lessThanOrEqual": "6.5.1",
                            "versionType": "semver"
                        }
                    ],
                    "defaultStatus": "unaffected"
                }
            ],
            "descriptions": [
                {
                    "lang": "en",
                    "value": "Any host on the LAN can send two mDNS records and make the responder write past the end of its\n\n\n\ntransmit packet.\n\n\n\nThe string table stores each name in a slot rounded up to a multiple of four:\n\n\n\n```c\n\n\n\n/* addons/mdns/nxd_mdns.c:11436, 11443, 11447 */\n\n\n\nmemory_len = ((memory_len & 0xFFFFFFFC) + 8) & 0xFFFFFFFF;\n\n\n\n...\n\n\n\nlen = *((USHORT*)(p - 2));           /* slot size, not string length */\n\n\n\nif ((len == memory_len) && ... _nx_mdns_name_match(start, memory_ptr, memory_size) ...)\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nThe lookup that decides whether an incoming name is already stored compares the rounded slot size,\n\n\n\nso names of 12, 13, 14 and 15 characters share one bucket. A second name in the bucket is answered\n\n\n\nwith the pointer to the first, and the record then carries a string up to three bytes longer than\n\n\n\nthe length the caller accounted for. `_nx_mdns_packet_rr_add` (nxd_mdns.c:8911) sizes its only\n\n\n\nbound check from that stale length, and `_nx_mdns_name_string_encode` writes the real string.\n\n\n\nTwo PTR records are enough, both ordinary mDNS responses to a `_http._tcp` query, with owner names\n\n\n\nwhose lengths fall in the same bucket:\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\n==87491==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow\n\n\n\nWRITE of size 1 at 0x611000000124 thread T5\n\n    #0 _nx_mdns_name_string_encode  addons/mdns/nxd_mdns.c:13096\n    #1 _nx_mdns_packet_rr_add       addons/mdns/nxd_mdns.c:8911\n\n\n0x611000000124 is 0 bytes to the right of 228-byte region\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nThe overflow is one to three bytes of attacker-influenced name data past `nx_packet_data_end`. In a\n\n\n\nnormal pool that lands in the next packet in the same pool rather than in a redzone, so the visible\n\n\n\neffect is a corrupted neighbouring packet or a corrupted pool free list rather than a clean crash.\n\n\n\nCompare the slot size against the stored string length before declaring a match, or keep the\n\n\n\nstring length in the slot header and return it to the caller so the encoder and the bound check\n\n\n\nagree.",
                    "supportingMedia": [
                        {
                            "type": "text/html",
                            "base64": false,
                            "value": "<p>Any host on the LAN can send two mDNS records and make the responder write past the end of its</p><p>transmit packet.</p><p>The string table stores each name in a slot rounded up to a multiple of four:</p><p>```c</p><p>/* addons/mdns/nxd_mdns.c:11436, 11443, 11447 */</p><p>memory_len = ((memory_len &amp; 0xFFFFFFFC) + 8) &amp; 0xFFFFFFFF;</p><p>...</p><p>len = *((USHORT*)(p - 2));           /* slot size, not string length */</p><p>if ((len == memory_len) &amp;&amp; ... _nx_mdns_name_match(start, memory_ptr, memory_size) ...)</p><p>```</p><p>The lookup that decides whether an incoming name is already stored compares the rounded slot size,</p><p>so names of 12, 13, 14 and 15 characters share one bucket. A second name in the bucket is answered</p><p>with the pointer to the first, and the record then carries a string up to three bytes longer than</p><p>the length the caller accounted for. `_nx_mdns_packet_rr_add` (nxd_mdns.c:8911) sizes its only</p><p>bound check from that stale length, and `_nx_mdns_name_string_encode` writes the real string.</p><p>Two PTR records are enough, both ordinary mDNS responses to a `_http._tcp` query, with owner names</p><p>whose lengths fall in the same bucket:</p><p>```</p><p>==87491==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow</p><p>WRITE of size 1 at 0x611000000124 thread T5</p><code>    #0 _nx_mdns_name_string_encode  addons/mdns/nxd_mdns.c:13096</code><br><code>    #1 _nx_mdns_packet_rr_add       addons/mdns/nxd_mdns.c:8911</code><br><p>0x611000000124 is 0 bytes to the right of 228-byte region</p><p>```</p><p>The overflow is one to three bytes of attacker-influenced name data past `nx_packet_data_end`. In a</p><p>normal pool that lands in the next packet in the same pool rather than in a redzone, so the visible</p><p>effect is a corrupted neighbouring packet or a corrupted pool free list rather than a clean crash.</p><p>Compare the slot size against the stored string length before declaring a match, or keep the</p><p>string length in the slot header and return it to the caller so the encoder and the bound check</p><p>agree.</p>"
                        }
                    ]
                }
            ],
            "references": [
                {
                    "url": "https://github.com/eclipse-threadx/netxduo/security/advisories/GHSA-2gf7-5224-5vrj"
                }
            ],
            "metrics": [
                {
                    "format": "CVSS",
                    "scenarios": [
                        {
                            "lang": "en",
                            "value": "GENERAL"
                        }
                    ],
                    "cvssV4_0": {
                        "attackVector": "ADJACENT",
                        "attackComplexity": "LOW",
                        "attackRequirements": "NONE",
                        "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
                        "userInteraction": "NONE",
                        "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
                        "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
                        "vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
                        "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
                        "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
                        "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
                        "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
                        "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
                        "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
                        "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
                        "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
                        "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED",
                        "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
                        "version": "4.0",
                        "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
                        "baseScore": 7.1,
                        "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
                    }
                }
            ],
            "credits": [
                {
                    "lang": "en",
                    "value": "L0stHeart",
                    "type": "reporter"
                }
            ],
            "source": {
                "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
            },
            "x_generator": {
                "engine": "Vulnogram 1.0.5"
            }
        },
        "adp": [
            {
                "metrics": [
                    {
                        "other": {
                            "type": "ssvc",
                            "content": {
                                "timestamp": "2026-09-29T18:41:47.412014Z",
                                "id": "CVE-2026-102715",
                                "options": [
                                    {
                                        "Exploitation": "none"
                                    },
                                    {
                                        "Automatable": "no"
                                    },
                                    {
                                        "Technical Impact": "partial"
                                    }
                                ],
                                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                                "version": "2.0.3"
                            }
                        }
                    }
                ],
                "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment",
                "providerMetadata": {
                    "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
                    "shortName": "CISA-ADP",
                    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-29T18:42:21.812Z"
                }
            }
        ]
    }
}