{ "dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": { "cveId": "CVE-2025-38413", "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "Linux", "dateReserved": "2025-04-16T04:51:24.013Z", "datePublished": "2025-07-25T13:20:17.394Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T12:01:42.803Z" }, "containers": { "cna": { "providerMetadata": { "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "shortName": "Linux", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T12:01:42.803Z" }, "descriptions": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvirtio-net: xsk: rx: fix the frame's length check\n\nWhen calling buf_to_xdp, the len argument is the frame data's length\nwithout virtio header's length (vi->hdr_len). We check that len with\n\n\txsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size() + vi->hdr_len\n\nto ensure the provided len does not larger than the allocated chunk\nsize. The additional vi->hdr_len is because in virtnet_add_recvbuf_xsk,\nwe use part of XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM for virtio header and ask the vhost\nto start placing data from\n\n\thard_start + XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM - vi->hdr_len\nnot\n\thard_start + XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM\n\nBut the first buffer has virtio_header, so the maximum frame's length in\nthe first buffer can only be\n\n\txsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size()\nnot\n\txsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size() + vi->hdr_len\n\nlike in the current check.\n\nThis commit adds an additional argument to buf_to_xdp differentiate\nbetween the first buffer and other ones to correctly calculate the maximum\nframe's length." } ], "metrics": [ { "cvssV3_1": { "version": "3.1", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H", "baseScore": 7.7, "baseSeverity": "HIGH" }, "scenarios": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "AV:L - The malicious input is the used-ring length reported by the virtio-net backend (untrusted hypervisor/host, vDPA/VDUSE backend, or virtio offload hardware), which is local to the guest kernel rather than delivered over the network. A remote network peer cannot trigger it, since a conforming backend can never report more bytes than the posted buffer holds.\nAC:L - The backend fully and deterministically controls the reported length field and can set it to `frame_size + 2*hdr_len` on every received packet; there is no race, no memory-layout dependency, and no condition outside the attacker's control.\nPR:N - The attacking device backend needs no credentials or privileges inside the target guest — the overflow is processed automatically in the virtio-net NAPI RX path with no guest-side authentication or capability check.\nUI:N - No victim action is required; the malformed length is consumed by `virtnet_receive_xsk_buf()` during normal NAPI packet reception once an AF_XDP zero-copy pool is bound to the queue.\nS:U - The out-of-bounds read and the resulting disclosure/crash are confined to the guest kernel that owns the vulnerable driver, so the vulnerable and impacted components share the same security authority.\nC:H - `xdp->data_end` is pushed past the end of the XSK chunk, and `xsk_construct_skb()`/`xsk_append_merge_buffer()` copy that out-of-bounds memory into an skb that is delivered to the guest network stack or retransmitted via XDP_TX/XDP_REDIRECT, leaking adjacent memory repeatedly at packet rate.\nI:N - Both copy destinations (`napi_alloc_skb()` and `napi_alloc_frag()`) are sized from the same inflated length that is copied, so no out-of-bounds write or kernel data modification occurs — the defect is a read-side bounds error only.\nA:H - The umem is a `vmap()` of pinned user pages, so reading past the final chunk lands on a vmalloc guard page and produces an unhandled kernel page fault/oops (and a KASAN BUG on hardened kernels), crashing the guest." } ] } ], "affected": [ { "product": "Linux", "vendor": "Linux", "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git", "programFiles": [ "drivers/net/virtio_net.c" ], "versions": [ { "version": "a4e7ba7027012f009f22a68bcfde670f9298d3a4", "lessThan": "892f6ed9a4a38bb3360fdff091b9241cfa105b61", "status": "affected", "versionType": "git" }, { "version": "a4e7ba7027012f009f22a68bcfde670f9298d3a4", "lessThan": "6013bb6bc24c2cac3f45b37a15b71b232a5b00ff", "status": "affected", "versionType": "git" }, { "version": "a4e7ba7027012f009f22a68bcfde670f9298d3a4", "lessThan": "5177373c31318c3c6a190383bfd232e6cf565c36", "status": "affected", "versionType": "git" } ] }, { "product": "Linux", "vendor": "Linux", "defaultStatus": "affected", "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git", "programFiles": [ "drivers/net/virtio_net.c" ], "versions": [ { "version": "6.11", "status": "affected" }, { "version": "0", "lessThan": "6.11", "status": "unaffected", "versionType": "semver" }, { "version": "6.12.37", "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*", "status": "unaffected", "versionType": "semver" }, { "version": "6.15.6", "lessThanOrEqual": "6.15.*", "status": "unaffected", "versionType": "semver" }, { "version": "6.16", "lessThanOrEqual": "*", "status": "unaffected", "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix" } ] } ], "cpeApplicability": [ { "nodes": [ { "operator": "OR", "negate": false, "cpeMatch": [ { "vulnerable": true, "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "versionStartIncluding": "6.11", "versionEndExcluding": "6.12.37" }, { "vulnerable": true, "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "versionStartIncluding": "6.11", "versionEndExcluding": "6.15.6" }, { "vulnerable": true, "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "versionStartIncluding": "6.11", "versionEndExcluding": "6.16" } ] } ] } ], "references": [ { "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/892f6ed9a4a38bb3360fdff091b9241cfa105b61" }, { "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6013bb6bc24c2cac3f45b37a15b71b232a5b00ff" }, { "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5177373c31318c3c6a190383bfd232e6cf565c36" } ], "title": "virtio-net: xsk: rx: fix the frame's length check", "x_generator": { "engine": "bippy-1.2.0" } } } }