{ "dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": { "cveId": "CVE-2024-44942", "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "Linux", "dateReserved": "2024-08-21T05:34:56.665Z", "datePublished": "2024-08-26T11:20:46.478Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T11:37:11.617Z" }, "containers": { "cna": { "providerMetadata": { "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "shortName": "Linux", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T11:37:11.617Z" }, "descriptions": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nf2fs: fix to do sanity check on F2FS_INLINE_DATA flag in inode during GC\n\nsyzbot reports a f2fs bug as below:\n\n------------[ cut here ]------------\nkernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inline.c:258!\nCPU: 1 PID: 34 Comm: kworker/u8:2 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6-syzkaller-00012-g9e4bc4bcae01 #0\nRIP: 0010:f2fs_write_inline_data+0x781/0x790 fs/f2fs/inline.c:258\nCall Trace:\n f2fs_write_single_data_page+0xb65/0x1d60 fs/f2fs/data.c:2834\n f2fs_write_cache_pages fs/f2fs/data.c:3133 [inline]\n __f2fs_write_data_pages fs/f2fs/data.c:3288 [inline]\n f2fs_write_data_pages+0x1efe/0x3a90 fs/f2fs/data.c:3315\n do_writepages+0x35b/0x870 mm/page-writeback.c:2612\n __writeback_single_inode+0x165/0x10b0 fs/fs-writeback.c:1650\n writeback_sb_inodes+0x905/0x1260 fs/fs-writeback.c:1941\n wb_writeback+0x457/0xce0 fs/fs-writeback.c:2117\n wb_do_writeback fs/fs-writeback.c:2264 [inline]\n wb_workfn+0x410/0x1090 fs/fs-writeback.c:2304\n process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline]\n process_scheduled_works+0xa12/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335\n worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416\n kthread+0x2f2/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388\n ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244\n\nThe root cause is: inline_data inode can be fuzzed, so that there may\nbe valid blkaddr in its direct node, once f2fs triggers background GC\nto migrate the block, it will hit f2fs_bug_on() during dirty page\nwriteback.\n\nLet's add sanity check on F2FS_INLINE_DATA flag in inode during GC,\nso that, it can forbid migrating inline_data inode's data block for\nfixing." } ], "metrics": [ { "cvssV3_1": { "version": "3.1", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "baseScore": 7.8, "baseSeverity": "HIGH" }, "scenarios": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "AV:L - The poisoned inode reaches `gc_data_segment()` only after a local mount of an attacker-supplied f2fs image via loop device or removable media, and the triggering GC/writeback activity is entirely local kernel work. There is no network or adjacent-network path into the f2fs garbage collector.\nAC:L - Setting `F2FS_INLINE_DATA` in the inode while leaving a valid blkaddr in its direct node is a direct on-disk edit, and `is_alive()` plus the phase-4 checks then pass deterministically; background GC is enabled by default and the attacker can size the image so free sections run low, forcing migration on demand. No race, timing, or memory-layout condition outside the attacker's control is involved.\nPR:L - An unprivileged local user gets the crafted image mounted through loop devices or desktop/kiosk/Android automounters (udisks2, systemd, vold), and no capability check exists on the GC or writeback path that follows. This matches how the repo scores equivalent f2fs on-disk validation bugs (CVE-2024-47690, CVE-2024-56692).\nUI:N - In the automount/loop scenario the attacker performs the mount itself and the background GC kthread plus the flusher worker drive the crash asynchronously. No separate victim action is required.\nS:U - The BUG_ON panic, the stuck page/node-page locks, and the corrupted inode block-pointer array all remain inside the kernel's own security authority and the mounted filesystem. No VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary is crossed.\nC:H - On the non-`CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS` path the WARN is non-fatal and the inode's `i_addr[]` array is replaced with attacker-chosen 32-bit values that f2fs subsequently dereferences as block addresses in `f2fs_get_dnode_of_data()`/`f2fs_map_blocks()`, allowing in-range blocks belonging to other files on the volume to be read back. The persisted metadata corruption therefore yields cross-file content disclosure, not merely a crash.\nI:H - `memcpy_from_page(inline_data_addr(inode, dn.inode_page), page, 0, MAX_INLINE_DATA(inode))` stomps roughly the whole `i_addr[]` block-pointer array of the inode with the contents of an unrelated data block the attacker controls, and `set_page_dirty(dn.inode_page)` writes that back to disk. The result is attacker-controlled corruption of filesystem metadata that the kernel only flags with `SBI_NEED_FSCK` rather than rejecting.\nA:H - With `CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS` the reported failure is an outright `kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inline.c:258` inside the writeback kworker, which dies holding the data page lock and the locked inode node page so every subsequent access to that inode and the bdi flusher deadlocks; without it the `WARN_ON` is fatal under `panic_on_warn` and otherwise repeats on every GC pass while marking the filesystem as needing fsck." } ] } ], "affected": [ { "product": "Linux", "vendor": "Linux", "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git", "programFiles": [ "fs/f2fs/gc.c" ], "versions": [ { "version": "98e4da8ca301e062d79ae168c67e56f3c3de3ce4", "lessThan": "ae00e6536a2dd54b64b39e9a39548870cf835745", "status": "affected", "versionType": "git" }, { "version": "98e4da8ca301e062d79ae168c67e56f3c3de3ce4", "lessThan": "26c07775fb5dc74351d1c3a2bc3cdf609b03e49f", "status": "affected", "versionType": "git" }, { "version": "98e4da8ca301e062d79ae168c67e56f3c3de3ce4", "lessThan": "fc01008c92f40015aeeced94750855a7111b6929", "status": "affected", "versionType": "git" } ] }, { "product": "Linux", "vendor": "Linux", "defaultStatus": "affected", "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git", "programFiles": [ "fs/f2fs/gc.c" ], "versions": [ { "version": "3.8", "status": "affected" }, { "version": "0", "lessThan": "3.8", "status": "unaffected", "versionType": "semver" }, { "version": "6.6.47", "lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*", "status": "unaffected", "versionType": "semver" }, { "version": "6.10.6", "lessThanOrEqual": "6.10.*", "status": "unaffected", "versionType": "semver" }, { "version": "6.11", "lessThanOrEqual": "*", "status": "unaffected", "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix" } ] } ], "cpeApplicability": [ { "nodes": [ { "operator": "OR", "negate": false, "cpeMatch": [ { "vulnerable": true, "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "versionStartIncluding": "3.8", "versionEndExcluding": "6.6.47" }, { "vulnerable": true, "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "versionStartIncluding": "3.8", "versionEndExcluding": "6.10.6" }, { "vulnerable": true, "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "versionStartIncluding": "3.8", "versionEndExcluding": "6.11" } ] } ] } ], "references": [ { "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ae00e6536a2dd54b64b39e9a39548870cf835745" }, { "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/26c07775fb5dc74351d1c3a2bc3cdf609b03e49f" }, { "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fc01008c92f40015aeeced94750855a7111b6929" } ], "title": "f2fs: fix to do sanity check on F2FS_INLINE_DATA flag in inode during GC", "x_generator": { "engine": "bippy-1.2.0" } }, "adp": [ { "metrics": [ { "other": { "type": "ssvc", "content": { "id": "CVE-2024-44942", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "options": [ { "Exploitation": "none" }, { "Automatable": "no" }, { "Technical Impact": "partial" } ], "version": "2.0.3", "timestamp": "2024-09-10T15:27:26.047934Z" } } } ], "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment", "providerMetadata": { "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "shortName": "CISA-ADP", "dateUpdated": "2024-09-12T17:33:04.269Z" } } ] } }