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TCP-pipelined queries can bypass tcp-clients limit
TCP-pipelined queries can bypass tcp-clients limit
Exploit-prediction scores from FIRST. Independent scoring and analysis status from the NVD. Vendor severity from Red Hat. Exploitation assessment and catalog membership from CISA.
Upgrade to the patched release most closely related to your current version of BIND: BIND 9.11.13 BIND 9.14.8 BIND 9.15.6 BIND Supported Preview Edition is a special feature preview branch of BIND provided to eligible ISC support customers. BIND 9.11.13-S1 Note that the fix for CVE-2019-6477 addresses only the server memory leak issue. TCP-pipelining may still malfunction by dropping some responses on a TCP connection where a client query pattern generates excessive outstanding queries, but the malfunction will affect that TCP connection alone and will not cause any degradation of service to other clients. An affected client connection might also appear to hang, but will clear when either the client or the server initiates a close or reset and will not remain in that state indefinitely. Disabling TCP-pipelining entirely is completely effective at mitigating the vulnerability with minimal impact to clients that use pipelined TCP connections and with no impact to clients that do not support TCP-pipelining. The majority of Internet client DNS queries are transported over UDP or TCP without use of TCP-pipelining.